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Helms: Contracts

CONTRACTS
I.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

In Kinsey ConstructionCo. v. South CarolinaDepartmentof
Mental Health' the South Carolina Supreme Court held that
whenever "the State of South Carolina pursuant to statutory authority enters into a valid contract, the State implicitly consents
to be sued and waives its sovereign immunity to the extent of its
contractual obligations."' 2 Kinsey thus provides that the state's
action of lawfully entering into an authorized contract constitutes
consent to be sued on that contract.
At common law, under the doctrine of sovereign immunity,
no action would lie against the state without its consent.3 South
Carolina courts traditionally interpreted this doctrine to require
the state's "express" consent to suit, such consent being in the
form of legislative authority.' In 1931, however, the supreme court
held in Chick Springs Water Co. v. State Highway Department5
that no legislative authority to sue the state was necessary when
the suit involved the taking of private property for public use
without just compensation. The court found that the constitutional provision involved' was self-executing and that no further
waiver of immunity was required.7 Chick Springs held that there
were two methods by which the state could waive its immunity:
express statutory language or a self-executing constitutional provision.
Harrisv. Fulp reaffirmed the position that the state enjoyed
immunity from suit unless waived expressly. Since Harris it has
generally been thought "that the State was immune from lawsuits, whether in contract or in tort, and that consent to be sued
could not arise by implication." 9 Indeed, in cases ex delicto it has
been expressly stated that a waiver of governmental immunity
1. S.C. - 249 S.E.2d 900 (1978).
2. Id. at _ 249 S.E.2d at 903.
3. 49 Am. JUR. States, Territoriesand Dependencies § 91 (1943).
4. Lowry v. Commissioner of Land, 25 S.C. 416, 419, 1 S.E. 141, 143 (1886).
5. 159 S.C. 481, 157 S.E. 842 (1931).
6. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 13 prohibits the taking of private property for public use
without just compensation.
7. 159 S.C. at 497, 157 S.E. at 848.
8. 178 S.C. 332, 183 S.E. 158 (1935).
9. Record at 44, Kinsey Constr. Co. v. South Carolina Dep't of Mental Health,
S.C.
, 249 S.E.2d 900 (1978).
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can never arise by implication.10 In contrast, Kinsey now holds
that sovereign immunity can be waived by implication in contract actions."
The contract in dispute in Kinsey was originally awarded to
Phillips Construction Company to build an alcohol and drug addiction center for the South Carolina Department of Mental
Health. The contract was subsequently assigned by Phillips to
Kinsey Construction Company with the written consent of the
Department. Thereafter, the Department became dissatisfied
with Kinsey's performance and terminated the contract. Kinsey
then instituted an action against the Department for breach of
contract. When its demurrer was overruled the Department appealed.2
Two grounds for demurrer were at issue before the supreme
court. The Department's first contention was that the state enjoyed sovereign immunity which precluded a suit to recover damages on a contract breached by a state agency. Second, the Department asserted that article 3, section 30 of the South Carolina
Constitution" was applicable and rendered unconstitutional an
award of extra compensation to a contractor after services had
4
been performed under a contract.'
In discussing the immunity issue, the supreme court agreed
with the Department that, absent a waiver of immunity, an individual cannot maintain an action against the state. The court did
not agree, however, that immunity can only be waived by a selfexecuting provision of the Constitution or by express statutory
language. The majority held that when the state enters into a
contract that was authorized by the legislature, the state has
consented to be sued in the event it breaches the contract. 5
The holding of the court, that the state implicitly consents
to be sued on authorized contracts, is not surprising in light of the
number of other jurisdictions that have adopted this view.' 6 Sur10. Brazell v. City of Camden, 238 S.C. 580, 121 S.E.2d 221 (1961); McKenzie v. City
of Florence, 234 S.C. 428, 108 S.E.2d 825 (1959).
11. S.C. at ,
249 S.E.2d at 903.
12. Id. at -, 249 S.E.2d at 901-02.
13. See text accompanying note 36 infra.
14. S.C. at -,
249 S.E.2d at 902.
15. Id. at -,
249 S.E.2d at 903.
16. George & Lynch, Inc. v. State, 57 Del. 158, 197 A.2d 734 (1964); Grant Constr.
Co. v,Burns, 92 Idaho 408, 443 P.2d 1005 (1968); Carr v. State, 127 Ind. 204, 26 N.E. 778
(1891); Kersten Co. v. Department of Social Servs., 207 N.W.2d 117 (Iowa 1973); V.S. Di
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prising, however, is the court's implication that its holding represented no change in existing South Carolina law. Prior to the
Kinsey decision, ostensibly it was the "established doctrine of
South Carolina that the State was immune from lawsuits,
and that consent to be sued could
whether in contract or in tort,
1' 7
not arise by implication.
The court in Kinsey stated that its holding was in accord
with the court's 1936 decision in Chesterfield County v. State
Highway Department.8 In that case, Chesterfield County
brought an action to compel the state treasurer to turn over for
cancellation certain bonds purchased from the county pursuant
to its contract with the state. The court denied the county's petition, stating that an adequate remedy existed at law:
It is true that the statutes which authorize the making of the
contract do not in express language confer upon either contracting party the power to sue the other for breach of contract. But
that right is one of necessary implication; it is a common-law
right.
...We hold that the authority given to make the contract
carries with it, by necessary implication, the authority to enforce the contract by an action at law.'"
This language is the basis for the supreme court's statement in
Kinsey that its decision "finds support" in the Chesterfield
County decision. 0 The majority does not state that it viewed
Chesterfield County as binding precedent for its decision in
Kinsey. Because of the differences between the two cases,2 ' the
court presumably could have limited Chesterfield County to its
own facts and reached a contrary conclusion in Kinsey.
The lone dissent in Kinsey centered on whether the circuit
courts have jurisdiction to hear cases involving claims against the
state. In his dissent Justice Littlejohn interpreted section 2-9-10
Carlo Constr. Co. v. State, 485 S.W.2d 52 (Mo. 1972); Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 222
S.E.2d 412 (1976); P.T. & L. Constr. Co. v.Commissioner of Dep't of Transp., 60 N.J.
308, 288 A.2d 574 (1972).
17. Record at 44, Kinsey Constr. Co. v. South Carolina Dep't of Mental Health,
, 249 S.E.2d 900 (1978).
S.C.
18. 181 S.C. 323, 187 S.E. 548 (1936).
19. Id. at 329, 187 S.E. at 550.
20.

-

S.C. at _,

249 S.E.2d at 902.

21. Chesterfield County involved the appropriateness of issuing a writ of mandamus,
181 S.C. at 324, 187 S.E. at 549, whereas Kinsey was a suit seeking payment for goods or
services rendered,

-

S.C. at _
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of the South Carolina Code2 as requiring Kinsey to submit its
claim to the State Budget and Control Board. Section 2-9-10
provides that "[a]ll claims for the payment for services rendered
or supplies furnished to the State shall be presented to the State
Budget and Control Board by petition, fully setting forth the facts
upon which such claim is based, together with such evidence
thereof as the Board may require."" The statute was adopted
pursuant to article 17, section 2 of the South Carolina Constitution, which provides that "[tihe General Assembly may direct,
by law, in what manner claims against the State may be established and adjusted." 4 Justice Littlejohn distinguished
Chesterfield County because it did not involve an action for
"services rendered or supplies furnished" to the state and found
that the statute was therefore inapplicable to that case. u
The majority rejected the argument that the State Budget
and Control Board has exclusive jurisdiction and pointed out that
article 5, section 7 of the South Carolina Constitution" grants
general jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases to the circuit court.
The majority did not reach the issue whether article 17, section 2
grants the General Assembly authority to remove jurisdiction
from the circuit court in suits against the state. Instead, it interpreted South Carolina Code section 15-77-502 as indicating legislative intent to specifically grant the circuit court jurisdiction
over civil actions against a state agency. That section mandates
that "[t]he circuit courts of this State are hereby vested with
jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions, actions and controversies . . . , affecting boards, commissions and agencies of
this State, and officials of the State in their official capacities in
the circuit where such question, action or controversy shall
2
arise." 1
According to the dissent's reasoning, the state could never be
sued in circuit court for payment for services rendered or supplies
furnished. Even suits that involve express statutory consent to be
22. S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-9-10 (1976).
23. Id.
24. S.C. CONST. art. 17, § 2.
-

S.C. at

26. S.C.

CONST.

25.

,

249 S.E.2d at 904 (Littlejohn, J., dissenting).

art. 5, § 7. The constitutional provision reads: "The Circuit Court

shall be a general trial court with original jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases, except

those cases in which exclusive jurisdiction shall be given to inferior courts.
27. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-77-50 (1976).
28. Id.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol31/iss1/5

... Id.

4

1979]

Helms: Contracts

CONTRACTS

sued and that involve self-executing provisions of the constitution
would seem to be foreclosed. The supreme court has traditionally
allowed individuals to sue the state in circuit court in such cases,
holding that sovereign immunity was waived.2 9 Kinsey does not
hold that the state can be sued when it enjoys sovereign immunity. When the state's immunity is intact, presumably the majority would agree with the dissent that claims should be processed
through the State Budget and Control Board. It is only when the
state has waived its immunity to suit that an action can be
brought in circuit court. The importance of Kinsey is that it
allows the waiver of immunity to be implied when the legislature
has authorized the making of a contract.
The majority's rationale in Kinsey is that the state should
not have the power to contract with individuals and still retain
the power to avoid its obligations.3 ° The doctrine of sovereign
immunity originated as a rule of social policy to protect the state
from interference with its governmental functions and to preserve
its control over state funds. Accordingly, subjecting the state to
suits by any citizen was considered a threat to the state's control
of its funds. 31 The extent to which Kinsey abrogates this rule of
social policy depends upon the clarification that the case ultimately will receive from the courts.
As stated previously, Kinsey holds that when the state enters
into a valid contract, it "implicitly consents to be sued and
waives its sovereign immunity to the extent of its contractual
obligations. 13 2 If "the extent of its contractual obligations" is
later interpreted by the courts to mean that an individual plaintiff's recovery will be limited to the amount of the original contract, then the suit threatens no more of the state's funds than
the state was already obligated to expend. This limitation, while
preserving the policy behind the sovereign immunity doctrine,
would undermine the apparent intent of the Kinsey majority to
remove from the state the power to avoid its contractual obligations. Under this interpretation, the state would be able to cause
plaintiffs serious delays and increased costs and then, if the costs
29. Moseley v. South Carolina Highway Dep't, 236 S.C. 499, 115 S.E.2d 172 (1960);
Smith v. Greenville, 229 S.C. 252, 92 S.E.2d 639 (1956); Chesterfield County v. State
Highway Dep't, 181 S.C. 323, 187 S.E. 548 (1936); Chick Springs Water Co. v. State
Highway Dep't, 159 S.C. 481, 157 S.E. 842 (1931).
30. S.C. at -,
249 S.E.2d at 903.
31. 72 AM. JuR. 2d States § 99 (1974).
32. S.C. at _,
249 S.E.2d at 903.
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exceeded the original contract price, avoid financial responsibility for such delays. Limiting the recovery to the original contract
price would, therefore, defeat the purpose of holding that the
state had waived its immunity to suit. No similar limitation has
been imposed in cases in which the waiver of immunity was by
express legislation or a self-executing constitutional provision.":
Once the state's immunity has been waived in a contract action,
the state should be liable for the damages attributable to its
breach to the same extent that an individual would be held liable,34 in the absence of constitutional or legislative authority to
the contrary.
In Kinsey, the Department of Mental Health asserted that
article 3, section 30 of the South Carolina Constitution35 precluded any recovery in a contract action for damages above the
contract price. Article 3, section 30 provides:
The General Assembly shall never grant extra compensation, fee
or allowance to any public officer, agent, servant, or contractor
after service rendered, or contract made, nor authorize payment
or part payment of any claim under any contract not authorized
by law, but appropriations may be made for expenditures in
repelling invasion, preventing or suppressing insurrection. 6
The majority in Kinsey explicitly indicated that the decision
made no determination of the effect of this constitutional provision; moreover, the court stated it could not say as a matter of
law that Kinsey's claims constituted demands for extra compensation within the meaning of article 3, section 30.3

The South Carolina Supreme Court has not ruled on the
effect of article 3, section 30 on construction contracts. 8 The trial
court and both parties in Kinsey, however, agreed that the provision is intended to prohibit the giving of gratuities and the making of payments to public officials or contractors beyond that to
which they are entitled by law or by a valid contract. 9 The provi33. See case cited in note 29 supra. It could also be argued that in a contract action,
unlike a tort action, the state could predict the amount of damages likely to be assessed
against it for breach with some fair degree of certainty. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 289 N.C.
303, 318, 222 S.E.2d 412, 424 (1976).
34. See 289 N.C. at 318, 222 S.E.2d at 424.
35. S.C. CONsT. art. 3, § 30.
36. Id.
249 S.E.2d at 904.
S.C. at -,
37. 38. Record at 32.
39. Id.; Brief of Appellant at 20-21; Brief of Respondent at 24-25.
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sion is not intended to prohibit the courts from "finding the legitimate amount of damages done to a litigant for breach of a contract."4 This interpretation is consistent with a dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Lewis in L-J, Inc. v. South Carolina State
Highway Department," stating that the prohibition is aimed at
the General Assembly and does not interfere with the jurisdiction
of the courts to determine contractual rights between the parties.4"
The opinions of the trial court in Kinsey and Chief Justice
Lewis in L-J on the effect of article 3, section 30 in actions for
breach of contract comport with the clear language of the constitutional provision as well as with the general view that a contractor's valid claim for damages does not constitute an increase in
the price to be paid under the contract." It would appear, therefore, that article 3, section 30 does not operate as a bar to Kinsey's
recovery, provided that Kinsey has a valid legal claim to the
alleged damages. If the claim is valid, then any damages awarded
would be compensation for past services rendered," and not in the
nature of a gratuity prohibited by article 3, section 30.
Kinsey makes it clear that a majority of the South Carolina
Supreme Court is receptive to modifications of the sovereign
immunity doctrine, although the court is not prepared to specifically abolish the doctrine.45 Nevertheless, as Justice Littlejohn
pointed out, "for all practical purposes, [Kinsey] abolishes the
doctrine of sovereign immunity as relates to contracts in this
state."4 Now the only prerequisite to maintaining a breach of
contract action against the state is a showing that the state officer
or agency entering into the contract was authorized to do so by
statute.47
40. Record at 33.
41. 270 S.C. 413, 242 S.E.2d 656 (1978).
42. Id. at 445, 242 S.E.2d at 670 (Lewis, C.J., dissenting).
43. 81A C.J.S. States § 173 (1977).
44. Record at 33.
45. See Brown v. Anderson County Hosp., 268 S.C. 479, 234 S.E.2d 873 (1977); Belton
v. Richland Memorial Hosp., 263 S.C. 446, 211 S.E.2d 241 (1975).
, 249 S.E.2d at 905 (Littlejohn, J., dissenting).
S.C. at
46. 2'49 S.E.2d at 903.
47. Id. at -,
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CONsTRucTION CONTRACTS-

RISK OF Loss FROM UNANTICIPATED COSTS

In L-J, Inc. v. South CarolinaState Highway Department,48
the South Carolina Supreme Court held that plaintiff contractors
were not entitled to additional compensation when they encountered substantially more rock than anticipated at a road construction site. L-J and Eastern Contractors were successful bidders4" for a unit price contract to perform work on a road construction project in Greenville County. The unit price nature of the
contract required contractors to bid a specific price for each unit
of work; the number of total units of each class of work was
estimated by the Department. The dispute arose over the compensation rate for removal of units of "unclassified material,"
which consisted of all subsurface matter whether it be sand, rock,
clay, or dirt. Although the total number of units of unclassified
material did not vary significantly from that estimated by the
Department,'" the project involved far more hard rock excavation
than anticipated by the contractors. The Department paid the
contractors at the unit price of $.34 per cubic yard for all unclassified material excavated.51 The contractors brought suit 2 to recover expenses over and above the contract price, anticipated
profit and financing charges incurred. 3
In formulating their bid, the contractors had relied on bid
materials furnished by the Department, including detailed cross48. 270 S.C. 413, 242 S.E.2d 656 (1978).
49. Plaintiffs' bid was $800,000 lower than the next highest bidder. Plaintiffs initially
were concerned over the discrepancy between their bid and that of the other contractors.
Consideration was given to rejecting the contract and forfeiting their bond. This procedure
was rejected out of the fear that it would strain relations with the Department, with which
plaintiffs did considerable business. Id. at 418, 242 S.E.2d at 657.
50. The contractor was to be paid at the unit price for the actual number of units
completed. If the total number of units of unclassified material varied by 20% or more
from the total estimated by the Department, the contract price was to be renegotiated.
The total amount of unclassified material found by the lower court to have been excavated
was 524,000 cubic yards above the Department's estimate of 8,067,924 cubic yards; the
variance was well within the 20% limit. Id. at 419, 426, 242 S.E.2d at 658, 661.
51. Id. at 420, 242 S.E.2d at 658.
52. The action was brought pursuant to S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-72 (1962) (current
version at S.C. CODE ANN. § 57-3-620 (1976)). Five causes of action were alleged: (1)
mutual mistake; (2) false representations; (3) breach of implied warranty; (4) unjust
enrichment; and (5) denial of due process of law and equal protection of the law as
provided in the state and federal constitutions. 270 S.C. at 418, 242 S.E.2d at 657.
53. Id.
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sections, a boring scroll, and a plan and profile of the project."
Prior to the bid, plaintiffs' representatives visited the construction site and examined the area. Although other bidders made
subsurface testings, plaintiffs did not do so, relying instead upon
the Department's information 5 Whether the Department's bid
information contained positive representations as to the subsurface conditions of the site, and, if so, whether the contractors'
reliance upon the bid information was justified, were questions of
fact before the trial court. The contract contained a notice that
the material was furnished for informational purposes only and
that work, whether increased or decreased, was to be performed
at the unit price."
At trial, Judge Grimball found that the Department's bid
information constituted an implied warranty that the topography, to the extent described, was as represented. The court found
that there was a mutual mistake by the contractors and the Department concerning the amount of rock present. In addition, the
court found that reliance by the contractors on the Department's
information was reasonable because of the limited twenty-oneday time period within which contractors were required to submit
bids. The lower court allowed the contractors to recover $409,000
plus interest, the actual cost of excavating the amount of solid
57
rock not anticipated by the contractors.
The supreme court reversed the lower court decision and held
that:
The Contractors, having entered into a solemn agreement,
must abide by the terms thereof. They took a risk for a consideration, and have no right to call upon the courts to protect them
against the consequences of erroneous judgment formulated by
their own carelessness and failure to make adequate tests and
investigation prior to bidding.
A majority of the court thus relied upon the fact that the contractors might have protected themselves by conducting their own
subsurface testing. This ignores the finding of the trial court that
the contractors' reliance on the Department's bid information
54. Record, vol. 1, at r-3. For a brief explanation of "boring scroll," see 270 S.C. at

426, 242 S.E.2d at 661.
55. 270 S.C. at 426, 242 S.E.2d at 661.
56. Id. at 433, 242 S.E.2d at 665.
57. Id. at 419, 242 S.E.2d at 658.
58. Id. at 434-35, 242 S.E.2d at 665.
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was reasonable under the circumstances.-" The majority opinion
refers to the accuracy of the boring scrolls furnished by the Department." There was, however, evidence in the record of inaccurate boring information and cross sections, as well as material
errors in the Department's plans."
As a general rule, the supreme court lacks the power to overturn a determination of fact made by the trial court in an action
at law" unless the appellate court finds that there was no evidence to support the trial court's decision.13 The majority opinion
does not hold that the findings of the trial judge were without
support in the record. As pointed out by Chief Justice Lewis in
his dissent, the majority appeared to be drawing its own inferences from the facts rather than limiting its review to a determination of whether the evidence supported the trial court's judgment. 4 Thus, although the majority decision is probably fair because the contractors could have protected themselves by conducting subsurface tests, 5 the decision is inconsistent with South
Carolina precedent holding that the court generally should not
delve into the facts on appeal. The majority may be indicating
that the court is extremely reluctant to afford relief to a contracting party merely because increased costs have caused performance to become overly burdensome. When the contracting party
could have protected itself from the increased costs, L-J indicates
that the supreme court will afford no relief.
Dorothy M. Helms
59. Id. at 441, 242 S.E.2d at 668-69 (Lewis, C.J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 431, 242 S.E.2d at 664.
61. Record, vol. 8, at 2315-16.
62. County Bank, Greenwood v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 244 S.C. 327, 137 S.E.2d
281 (1964); Beard v. Aiken County Stores, 175 S.C. 421, 179 S.E. 616 (1935).
63. Dillard v. Blackman, 258 S.C. 158, 187 S.E.2d 643 (1972); Fogle v. Void, 223 S.C.
83, 74 S.E.2d 358 (1953); Harrison v. Lanoway, 214 S.C. 294, 52 S.E.2d 264 (1949).
64. 270 S.C. at 445, 242 S.E.2d at 671 (Lewis, C.J., dissenting).
65. Based on their subsurface testings, all other contractors bid at least $800,000 more
than plaintiffs. Id. at 418, 242 S.E.2d at 657. The $409,000 recovery awarded by the trial
court was less than that discrepancy. Id. This indicates that plaintiffs would probably
have bid high enough to cover their actual costs had they conducted their own subsurface
tests.

66. See cases cited in note 62 supra.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol31/iss1/5

10

